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The past decades witnessed a broad trend towards flatter organizations with less 
hierarchical layers. A reduction of the number of management levels in a corpora-
tion can have both positive and negative effects on firm performance with the net 
effect being theoretically unclear ex ante. The present study uses a nationally 
representative data set of firms in Switzerland and empirically examines the di-
rect performance effects of delayering. Applying ordinary least squares regressions 
and propensity score matching, this study finds that delayering significantly in-
creases subsequent firm performance. It can be concluded that flatter hierarchical 
structures seem to enable firms to better realize their competitive advantage in 
today’s fast moving and knowledge-intensive market environment. 
 
Keywords:   Delayering, management levels, hierarchical layers, hierarchy, firm 
performance, treatment effects, selection bias. 




The most fundamental elements to describe the shape of an organization are its 
breadth  and  its  depth  (Colombo  and  Delmastro  2002,  2008;  Rajan  and  Wulf 
2006; Wang 2007). The depth of an organization is the number of hierarchical 
layers or management levels between the top management and operational em-
ployees.
1 The breadth can be measured by the span of control, i.e. the number of 
a supervisor’s direct reports or subordinates. The span of control can be calcu-
lated at each hierarchical layer, but it can also be averaged across the levels of an 
organization.
2 Obviously, there exists an inverse relationship between depth and 
breadth, given organizational size (see Figure 1 in the appendix).
3  
Delayering means the reduction of the number of management levels in an or-
ganization, i.e. the flattening of an organization’s hierarchy. However, it should 
not be confused with other related concepts of corporate restructuring, such as 
downsizing or decentralization (Littler, Wiesner and Dunford 2003; Rajan and 
Wulf 2006). Downsizing basically means workforce reduction. If certain manage-
ment levels are targeted, this can lead to delayering.
4 Accordingly, most delayer-
ing programs involve downsizing (Littler and Innes 2004; Littler, Wiesner and 
Dunford 2003). On the other hand, larger firms have even found to increase the 
number of hierarchical layers while downsizing (Wang 2007).
5 Decentralization 
means the delegation of decision-making authority to lower management levels. If 
decision power of wiped-out managerial positions is relocated down the hierarchy, 
delayering would indeed imply more decentralization (Rajan and Wulf 2006). The 
                                                 
 
1 It seems to be matter of convention whether one counts including or excluding top management or 
operational employees, or whether managers with center responsibility are considered instead of 
operational employees. For instance, considering (b) of Figure 1: Jost (2009) would label this as 
having a depth of one; Wang (2007) would attach two levels to that organization; the KOF ques-
tionnaires used in the present study exclude both the top and the bottom level so that, in this ex-
ample, there would be a depth of zero; eventually, Rajan and Wulf (2006) count only the number of 
levels between the CEO and the divisional managers, excluding both. 
2 The average span of control s would then have to satisfy the following equation, where n is the 
number of employees and l is the number of hierarchical layers (Colombo and Delmastro 1999, 
2008): 
1 2 ... 1
− + + + + =
l s s s n  
3 Accordingly, Rajan and Wulf (2006) report a significantly negative correlation between breadth 
and depth, based on a sample of 300 large US firms. 
4 Consequently, Datta et al. (2010) consider delayering as one of various “phrases or euphemisms” 
for downsizing. Similarly, Littler et al. (1997) regard delayering, downsizing and other “restructur-
ing concepts” as sharing the commonality of workforce reduction. 
5 According to Wang (2007), this result could be explained by the greater need for solving control 
and coordination problems within larger firms.  
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same would hold true, if supervisors are confronted with more direct reports, i.e. 
a greater span of control. In this case, they would have to concentrate on key 
managerial tasks, such as communicating goals and managing exceptions, while 
employees’  involvement  in  decision  processes  could  be  enhanced  (Lazear  and 
Gibbs 2009, BCG 2004, 2006a, b, Åhlström and Karlsson 2000). On the other 
hand, however, a CEO in a flatter hierarchy gets in touch with more unit heads 
and, thus, can influence more decisions. This perspective would suggest more cen-
tralization implied by delayering (Rajan and Wulf 2006).  
The 1990s witnessed a broad trend towards flatter, i.e. less deep organizations. 
There is evidence from several developed countries based on large-scale data sets 
documenting this delayering trend (Table 1). The following factors are seen as 
causes for this delayering trend (Rajan and Wulf 2006; Sohr 2005; Littler, Wies-
ner and Dunford 2003): increased competition in product markets, the need of 
quickly  taken  and  complex  decisions,  increased  importance  of  human  capital
6, 
active institutional investors in the stock markets, and information technology 
that facilitates the coordination role of middle managers by reducing communica-
tion costs
7. This view is in line with evidence from several large-scale quantitative 
studies (Colombo and Delmastro 2008; Acemoglu et al. 2007; Wang 2007; Rajan 
and Wulf 2006; Brews and Tucci 2004; Caroli and Van Reenen 2001; Whittington 
et al. 1999; Ruigrok et al. 1999; and Collins, Ryan and Matusik 1999).  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
A reduction of the number of management levels in an organization can have 
both positive and negative effects on firm performance. Flatter organizations al-
low a better information flow and, thus, enable faster decisions (Colombo and 
Delmastro 2008, Carzo and Yanouzas 1969). Moreover, employees’ intrinsic moti-
vation is supposed to be higher in a flatter and, therefore, less bureaucratic work-
ing  environment  (Kettley  1995;  see  also  Littler,  Wiesner  and  Dunford  2003; 
McCann, Morris and Hassard 2008). Apart from that, monitoring employees in a 
flatter hierarchy can be easier (BCG 2004, 2006a, b). Competition for open posi-
tions may be tougher because of a larger number of employees at the same man-
agement level (Sohr 2005). Finally, total costs associated with management levels 
                                                 
 
6 Nikolowa (2010) presents a theoretical model that explains how firms react to a more abundant 
supply of skilled labor by lowering the number of hierarchical levels, i.e. by delayering. 
7 However, to the extent to which information technology (IT) enhances the access to information, 
it is even possible that the introduction of IT increases the number of corporate layers (Rajan and 
Wulf 2006, Lazear and Gibbs 2009).  
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decrease with the number of hierarchical layers. Consequently, removing hierar-
chical layers could improve firm performance.  
However, flatter organizations can also have adverse effects. If employees at cer-
tain levels have to leave the firm, valuable knowledge and human capital might 
get lost (Datta et al. 2010), while staying employees might suffer the so-called 
survivor syndrome (Datta et al. 2010; Cascio 1993; Littler, Wiesner and Dunford 
2003; McCann, Morris and Hassard 2008). In general, employees’ effort might 
decrease due to a small option value of any promotion in a flat hierarchy (Lazear 
and  Rosen  1981;  Littler,  Wiesner  and  Dunford  2003;  McCann,  Morris  and 
Hassard 2008). In flatter organizations, parts of resources are bound in an unpro-
ductive manner because more conflicts have to be resolved by colleagues without 
intermediation of a supervisor (Carzo and Yanouzas 1969). Finally, the introduc-
tion of reorganization measures could lead to influence activities; employees have 
to adjust to the new way of working; and investments in old production and/or 
communication  processes  become  sunk  costs  (Colombo  and  Delmastro  2008). 
Consequently, removing hierarchical layers could deteriorate firm performance.  
The aim of the present study is to empirically investigate the net effect of delay-
ering programs on subsequent firm performance. Previous studies tackle this re-
search question using experiments (Carzo and Yanouzas 1969), on a case study 
basis (Kettley 1995, n = 8), using small-scale data sets (Shaw and Schneier 1993, 
n = 8), on the basis of senior executives’ subjective evaluation of middle manag-
ers’ productivity (Littler, Wiesner and Dunford 2003), or within the framework of 
so-called high-performance work systems (Cristini et al. 2003). Against this back-
ground, the author of the present study is not aware of any large-scale quantita-
tive-econometric study on the direct effect of delayering on firm performance.  
For this purpose, the Innovation Survey 2005 is used, a nationally representative 
data set of 2’575 firms in Switzerland which was collected by the Swiss Economy 
Institute (KOF) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ). 
The empirical model is an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function. Produc-
tivity and profitability (efficiency) measures based on value added and wages are 
used as performance indicators. Controlling for a wide range of firm characteris-
tics and market conditions, an ordinary least squares regression is applied. To 
control for a potential selectivity bias in evaluating the treatment effects of a 




The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 theoretically dis-
cusses potential positive and negative performance effects of delayering. Section 3 
presents related empirical literature. Section 4 contains the empirical investiga-
tion. At first, the data set and variables used are described. Next, the economet-
ric modeling of various specifications is explained. Finally, the results obtained 
are presented. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Theoretical Background 
A reduction of management levels can have both positive and negative effects on 
firm performance. Both will be discussed in turn. 
2.1 Positive effects on firm performance 
Usually, flatter organizations are seen as allowing for a better information flow 
and  thus  faster  decisions  and  execution  of  decisions  (Colombo  and  Delmastro 
2008, Carzo and Yanouzas 1969). Even if one abstracts from agency problems or 
conflicts of interest between organization members: in a steep hierarchy, a strat-
egy approved by top management could differ from the measures taken by lower 
level managers to implement this strategy simply because of communication fail-
ures across layers. And even if the measures taken are the right ones to imple-
ment a given strategy, there may be a time delay between strategy approval and 
execution. So those measures could be obsolete at that point in time because 
critical conditions for the strategy decision might have changed in the mean time. 
That is why, in today’s fast moving business environment, fast communication 
channels are a competitive advantage for firms.  
In addition, the absolute number of decisions made can be increased by flattening 
a hierarchy in conjunction with decentralization (Lazear and Gibbs 2009, Co-
lombo and Delmastro 2008). By delegating decision-making authority to lower 
levels, top management is less likely to exhibit information overload and, thus, to 
run the risk of being a bottle neck. Consequently, more – and more complex – 
decisions can be made by an organization as a whole. 
Moreover,  employees’  attitudes,  such  as  intrinsic  motivation,  satisfaction  and 
commitment, are supposed to be higher in a flatter and, thus, less bureaucratic 
working environment because of more legitimacy, freedom to take decisions and  
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calculated risks as well as freedom to choose how to utilize available resources 
(Littler, Wiesner and Dunford 2003). Kettley (1995) relates this positive effect to 
“greater  opportunities  for  ownership,  involvement  and  responsibility”.  It  seems 
that in a flattened hierarchy, motivation stems not so much from promotion op-
portunities but rather from intrinsic – apart from financial – rewards concerning 
the job itself (McCann, Morris and Hassard 2008). In line with this reasoning, 
Dopson and Stewart (1994) find that most of the middle managers in their sam-
ple of 43 organizations in six Western-European countries have positive feelings 
about “the additional responsibility and variety of their work” related to flatter 
hierarchies.  
In a flattened hierarchy, the number of employees at the same level increases. 
Thus, competition for open positions at higher levels may become tougher. If it is 
not  undermined  by  sabotage  activities,  this  strong  competition  could  improve 
employees’ working effort, leading to higher labor productivity (Sohr 2005). A 
related point is that avoiding sideway career movements has already become an 
incentive for employees to show high effort level (McCann, Morris and Hassard 
2008).  
Apart from that, monitoring in a flatter hierarchy is easier, if tasks are allocated 
in a way such that employees specialize in either doing an operational job or su-
pervising others. In that case, supervisors can focus on communicating goals and 
managing exceptions, i.e. situations in which those goals are not met (BCG 2004, 
2006a, b).  
Finally, total costs associated with layers (e.g., wages of managers at those layers, 
supervisory costs, etc.) decrease with the number of layers. So not only labor 
productivity but also labor efficiency (profitability) has the potential to increase.  
The factors discussed in this section suggest that removing hierarchical layers 
could improve firm performance. However, delayering can also have adverse ef-
fects. Those are discussed in the next section.  
2.2 Negative effects on firm performance 
If employees at certain levels – most often: middle managers (Littler, Wiesner and 
Dunford 2003) – have to leave a firm, valuable knowledge and human capital 
might be lost and organizational relationship networks might be disrupted, dimin-
ishing the firm’s long-term competitive advantage (Datta et al. 2010). Staying  
 
- 6 -
employees might suffer the so-called survivor syndrome, a set of attitudinal reac-
tions that lead to lower levels of satisfaction, motivation and commitment and to 
higher levels of workload, stress, burnout, resistance, fluctuation and intention to 
leave  (Datta  et  al.  2010;  Cascio  1993;  Littler,  Wiesner  and  Dunford  2003; 
McCann, Morris and Hassard 2008; Armenakis and Beteian 1999). Those reac-
tions could directly translate into lower labor productivity and employees’ psy-
chological contracts (Rousseau 1995) might suffer damage. For instance, employ-
ees  could  find  it  difficult  to  accept  the  above  mentioned  sideway  career 
movements (McCann, Morris and Hassard 2008).  
Furthermore, employees’ reactions can depend on the reason for delayering (Sohr 
2005). If adverse external demand developments threaten the firm as a whole, 
postponed promotions – an inevitable consequence of delayering – would be seen 
as more justified than if, e.g., top management decided to introduce new ICT 
complemented  by  fewer  hierarchical  levels.  In  this  example,  sluggish  demand 
would  be  regarded  as  an  exogenous  factor,  whereas  investment  decisions  are 
endogenously made by managers. Indeed, recent research (Michel, Stegmaier and 
Sonntag 2010) shows that (perceived) procedural justice – i.e., giving employees 
the feeling that they are valuable members of the organization – directly affects 
employees’ commitment to change. Moreover, the authors find that employees’ 
change-supporting behavior can be improved by a positive organizational identifi-
cation which, in turn, is positively influenced by (perceived) procedural justice. 
According to tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981), any promotion can be 
regarded as the winner prize in a competition among employees. The higher posi-
tion is usually associated with a higher wage, but also with the perspective of 
another promotion to the next but one position. This is the option value of that 
promotion. Against this background, fewer management levels – due to delayer-
ing – imply that new entrants cannot be promoted as often as before. Thus, the 
option value of any promotion decreases. Consequently, employees’ effort may 
decline because the winner prize has become lower (Littler, Wiesner and Dunford 
2003; McCann, Morris and Hassard 2008; Sohr 2005). To uphold working effort, 
the wage level or wage dispersion could be increased 
Since in flatter organizations – ceteris paribus – there are more people at the 
same hierarchical position, employees have to do several managerial tasks without 
the intervention of a supervisor (Carzo and Yanouzas 1969). They have to coor-
dinate their actions with each other so as to prevent redundant work. Potentially, 
asymmetric information distribution would make it necessary to exchange infor- 
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mation. However, this could be hindered by conflicts of interests. Apart from 
that, conflicts unrelated to asymmetric information distribution also have to be 
solved directly by the opponents. This binds resources in an unproductive way.  
Finally, Colombo and Delmastro (2008) pick up a dynamic perspective of organ-
izational change. The authors develop a conceptual framework of factors affecting 
adjustment costs associated with organizational innovation. First, investments in 
physical capital or human resources usually are tied up with a specific production 
process.  Changing  this  production  process  turns  such  investments  into  sunk 
costs.
8 Second, organizational change requires that employees adapt to new proc-
esses and interaction modes. To the extent that old knowledge becomes redun-
dant this adaption requires a learning curve, which could be negative before it 
turns positive. Thus, short-term productivity loss may be the price for (expected) 
long-term productivity gains. Third, any organizational change is associated with 
a redistribution of quasi-rents among organizational members. Thus, in order to 
protect the own (positive) rents or to increase (negative) rents, certain employees 
can have the incentives to engage in influence activities.  
The factors discussed in this section suggest that removing hierarchical layers 
could deteriorate firm performance. Summing up the theoretical discussion, the 
net effect of the various positive and negative consequences of delayering pro-
grams is ex ante unclear. Therefore, the present study aims at investigating this 
issue applying econometric methods. But before turning to that, related empirical 
studies are discussed in the next section.  
3. Related Literature 
40 years ago, Carzo and Yanouzas (1969) conducted a laboratory experiment.
9 
Two organizations were simulated, a tall one and a flat one, but each with 15 
members, one of which being the president. The tall organization had four hierar-
chical layers (including the highest and the lowest level) and a span of control of 
two at each level. The flat organization had two levels and a span of control of 14 
(see Figure 1 in the appendix). Both organizations had to imitate the ordering of 
                                                 
 
8 Another, but connected argument is that any organizational change erases the option of adopting 
other innovations (path dependency). Therefore, firms might find it optimal to hold on to the old 
organizational structure for a longer time. 
9 Although it was a refinement of prior experiments, this study was subject to methodological criti-
cism (Hummon 1970, Carzo and Yanouzas 1970).  
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goods from suppliers, taking into account costs, inventory and expected revenues, 
given a probability distribution of demand. Clear procedures for communication 
and decision making were given. The experiment lasted for 60 rounds. Results 
indicate that the tall organization was significantly better in terms of profits and 
rate of return on sales. Given the rather stable task structure, this comes at no 
surprise. However, no statistically significant difference could be found in terms of 
decision time. The authors explain this result by a trade-off between information 
processing and coordination. Whereas information processing in the tall structure 
took longer, the flat structure needed more time to resolve conflicts and coordi-
nate  efforts.  Both  organizations  exhibited  a  steady  decrease  in  decision  time, 
which is evidence for a learning curve effect.  
Kettley’s (1995) report contains eight case studies of organizations in the UK 
having reduced their number of management levels.
10 In one case, a retailing firm 
realized  faster  decision-making  processes  in  the  field  of  temporary  staffing 
through  the  relocation  of  the  temporary  staffing  responsibility  from  the  area 
management down to a network of local stores. Kettley’s (1995) evidence seems 
to contrast with the experiment of Carzo and Yanouzas (1969) who found no 
difference in decision time between tall and flat organizations. However, the busi-
ness environment has become more and more dynamic during the past decades 
(Snower 1999; Lindbeck and Snower 2000; Caroli, Greenan and Guellec 2001), so 
that  flattened  organizations  today may  be  able  to  realize  economies of  speed, 
whereas in the 1960s, market conditions were rather stable. 
Shaw and Schneier (1993) consider performance measures for eight corporations – 
among them are Hewlett-Packard, Intel, GE and PepsiCo – that have reduced 
management levels. The authors find that sales growth, profit growth and return 
on capital – each averaged over five years – are higher for these corporations than 
for their respective industry peers. This mean comparison provides some insight 
into positive quantitative performance effects of delayering.  
Littler, Wiesner and Dunford (2003) use data on organizations with 50 or more 
employees in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The authors find that 
over half of 1’164 organizations report increased middle managers’ productivity, 
as evaluated by senior executives. About a fourth of the organizations report no 
change, whereas a minority of them reports a decrease in productivity (remaining: 
                                                 
 
10 Unfortunately, there are no details on the case study organizations given in the report.  
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do not know). Additionally, the authors provide evidence of significant increase in 
workload within delayered organizations (n = 2’757). Finally, the extent to which 
middle  managers  of  delayered  organizations  suffer  from  the  so-called  survivor 
syndrome is indicated. Important attitudinal variables such as morale, commit-
ment, motivation and satisfaction mostly deteriorate in Australia and South Af-
rica, but not in New Zealand, whereas there are lower perceived promotional op-
portunities  and  more  concerns  about  job  security  in  all  three  countries  (n  = 
1’164).  
Cristini et al. (2003) econometrically examine a data set of 100 Italian manufac-
turing firms. Being endowed with cross-sectional information on new work prac-
tices, but with longitudinal balance sheet data, the authors are able to apply a 
two-step procedure by Black and Lynch (2001) to control for unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity in estimating productivity effects of “new work practices”. 
In order to detect potential complementarities, interaction terms are tested. Strik-
ingly, according to the authors, most of the pairwise interactions and all of the 
three-way interactions contain a flattened hierarchical structure as element of a 
so-called high-performance work system. This suggests that delayering is an im-
portant condition for flexible workplace practices to have a positive performance 
effect. 
Further insights into the shape of the performance effects of a flatter hierarchy 
can be gained by the study of Bauer and Bender (2001), who examine the effects 
of delayering (and other “flexible work systems”) on wages and firms’ internal 
wage structure. Drawing on a nationally representative linked employer-employee 
panel data set for Germany and applying panel methods, the authors find that 
removing  managerial  levels  increases  subsequent  mean  wages  and  widens  the 
wage distribution, especially at the upper parts. These results suggest that the 
effects of delayering on productivity (e.g., value added per worker) could be lar-
ger than the effects on profitability (e.g., value added over total wages). The eco-
nomic rationale for this expectation is that higher wages have to be paid in order 
to compensate employees for the smaller option value of any promotion in a flat-
ter hierarchy to keep motivation and effort at a high level.  
Given the literature presented in this section, the author of this study is not 
aware of any large-scale quantitative-econometric study on the direct effect of 
delayering on firm performance. Therefore, based on a nationally representative 
data set of 2’575 firms in Switzerland, the present study aims at contributing to 
this field of research. An ordinary least squares regression is applied, which con- 
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trols for a wide range of firm characteristics and market conditions. A propensity 
score matching procedure is additionally implemented to control for a potential 
selectivity bias in evaluating the treatment effects of a delayering program. In 
this respect the present study should be able to add significantly to the existing 
literature. 
4. Empirical Investigation 
4.1 Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
This study uses the Innovation Survey 2005, a data set of firms in Switzerland, 
which was collected by the Swiss Economy Institute (KOF) at the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology Zurich (ETHZ). The data set is a (with respect to indus-
try and firm size) stratified random sample of the Business Census, a total popu-
lation survey of all establishments and firms of the Second and Third Sector in 
Switzerland, which was conducted by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Non-
for-profit service industries were excluded by the KOF. For the Innovation Sur-
vey, the KOF sent out about 6’700 questionnaires, of which 2’575 were returned.  
Dependent variables are log value added, lnVA, (i.e., sales minus cost of materials 
and outside services) in CHF as a productivity measure and the log of value 
added over total wages, ln(VA/W), as a profitability (efficiency) measure. Both 
measures refer to 2004. It is important to also consider the latter performance 
indicator, since the discussion above suggested that, by delayering, firms decrease 
the option value of any promotion. To compensate for this potentially negative 
effect on working effort and to uphold incentives for employees, wages or wage 
dispersions within firms could have to increase if management levels are removed.  
The key explanatory variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has 
reduced the number of hierarchical layers since 2000 (delayer). Control variables 
are dummy variables indicating whether a firm has downsized by selling divisions 
or outsourcing functions since 2000 (down); whether decision power has been de-
centralized, i.e. the distribution of competencies at the workplace has shifted to-
wards workers, since 2000 (decentr); whether a firm is mostly foreign-owned (for-
eign); whether the usage of information and communication technologies – the 
sum of computers, internet and intranet, each measured on a five-point Likert 
scale – is above the median (ICT01); whether the intensity of competition in the  
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main product market concerning both price and non-price criteria is above the 
median (intens01); and whether the number of competitors is above the median 
(compet01). Further controls are total investments in CHF as proxi for capital 
(lnK); the number of employees as proxi for labor (lnL); the number of manage-
ment levels (level); the share of skilled workers (skilled); the percentage of staff 
having participated at training (train); the export share of sales (export); and 
controls for the seven Greater Regions in Switzerland and for seven sectors. Table 
A1 in the appendix provides descriptive statistics of the variables used. 
Table 2 displays transition probabilities of 662 firms that had already been sur-
veyed in 2000. The KOF Organization Survey 2000 is similar to the Innovation 
Survey concerning sampling methodology and sample size. The two surveys can 
be merged using a unique identifier. The rows in Table 2 represent the number of 
management levels in 2000, the columns those of 2005. As can been seen, over 60 
% of firms with four hierarchical layers have undergone delayering during this 
period. For firms with more layers, this percentage is even higher. These numbers 
suggest that delayering still is a wide-spread phenomenon.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4.2 Regression Analysis & Treatment Evaluation 
4.2.1 Econometric Models 
The baseline specification is a Cobb-Douglas production function, which is aug-
mented by a dummy variable indicating whether a firm has removed management 
levels during the past five years (delayer). To eliminate other influences on firm 
performance,  a  wide  range  of  firm  characteristics  and market  conditions  Xj  is 
added to the estimation equation as well, which then becomes: 
∑ = + + + + + =
n
1 j i j i j i i 2 i 1 0 i u X δ delayer γ lnL β lnK β β lnVA ,   (1) 
where ln is the natural logarithm operator, VA is value added, K represents the 
capital stock, L describes labor and u is an i.i.d. random variable (i is the firm 
index). As an alternative dependent variable, the log of value added over total 
wages, ln(VA/W), is also used throughout this study. Equation (1) is estimated 
by  ordinary  least  squares  (OLS).  Standard  errors  are  heteroscedasticity-robust 
according to White (1980).   
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OLS assumes that delayering is exogenous. However, a firm’s decision to remove 
management  levels  may  well  be  endogenously  determined.  For  instance,  firms 
that are in the middle of a reorganization phase could be more likely to delayer in 
order to complement other measures like downsizing or decentralization. Other 
firms may be more prone to reorganizing measures in general. Not accounting for 
such a selectivity bias could lead to biased estimates of the performance effects of 
delayering.  
Therefore,  a  propensity  score  matching  (PSM)  procedure  (Heckman,  Ichimura 
and Todd 1997) is additionally implemented to control for a potential selectivity 
bias in evaluating the treatment effects of a delayering program. The basic idea of 
matching in general is to compare the outcomes of two similar groups that differ 
only in one respect, namely whether they have delayered or not. The difference in 
mean outcomes between the two groups is the average treatment effect (ATE) 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2006, Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008):  
) 0 | ( ) 1 | (
0 = − = = ∆ d VA ln E d lnVA E
1
ATE ,             (2) 
where  d  indicates  whether  or  not  a  firm  has  delayered,  i.e.  whether  it  was 
“treated”.  The  ATE  compares  the  actual  outcomes  of  treated  firms, 
) 1 | ( = d lnVA E
1 ,  with  that  of  non-treated,  ) 0 | (
0 = d VA ln E .  However,  to  the 
extent to which those two groups differ with respect to other characteristics – i.e. 
in case of a selectivity bias – the ATE is not an adequate measure for the per-
formance  effect  of  delayering.  Rather,  the  actual  outcome  of  treated  firms, 
) 1 | ( = d lnVA E
1 , would have to be compared with the outcome that would have 
resulted, had these firms not been treated,  ) 1 | (
0 = d VA ln E . This is what the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) does. The ATT is given by:  
) 1 | (
0 = − = ∆ d VA ln lnVA E
1
ATT .         (3) 
The latter term,  ) 1 | (
0 = d VA ln E , denotes the so-called counter-factual outcome, 
i.e.  the  outcome  of  a  treated  firm,  had  it  not  been  treated.  Obviously,  the 
counter-factual  outcome  cannot  be  observed.  However,  if  an  adequate  control 
group can be generated on the basis of observable characteristics Z, the outcome 
of this control group can be used as a substitute for the counter-factual outcome. 
For this to be possible, three conditions have to hold (Caliendo and Kopeinig 
2008; Pfeifer 2009; Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon 2002):  
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First, the conditional independence assumption (CIA) states that firm perform-
ance  is  independent  of  delayering,  conditional  on  characteristics  Z: 
Z d VA ln lnVA
0 | ,
1 ⊥ . This condition ensures that treatment is conditionally ran-
dom and mitigates the selectivity bias. However, for the estimation of ATTs, a 
weak form of the CIA, the conditional mean independence assumption (CMIA), is 
sufficient. The CMIA states that the firm performance without delayering is – or 
would be – the same in both groups, i.e. in the treatment and the control group, 
given characteristics Z:  Z d lnVA
0 | ⊥ . The CMIA can be equivalently written as: 
) , 0 | ( ) , 1 | (
0 Z d VA ln E Z d lnVA E
0 = = = .                (4) 
Second, the common support or overlap condition states that there must be a 
positive  probability  of  having  delayered  and  having  not  delayered,  given  Z: 
1 ) | 1 ( 0 < = < Z d P . This condition ensures that there are treated and non-treated 
firms available for matching, given Z. This implies that Z does not allow the per-
fect prediction of the treatment status. For the estimation of ATTs, a weak form 
of the overlap condition is sufficient:  1 ) | 1 ( < = Z d P . 
Third, the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) states that the per-
formance effects of a delayering program for a given firm are independent of the 
number of other firms that also undertake delayering. This condition rules out 
general equilibrium or spill-over effects. 
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), firm characteristics Z are first combined 
to a one-dimensional propensity score P[Z] applying a probit maximum likelihood 
estimation of delayering. Recognizing this and substituting equation (4) into (3) 
gives the ATT, which is then estimated by PSM (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008, 
Pfeifer 2009): 
])} [ , 0 | ( ]) [ , 1 | ( {
0




ATT = − = = ∆ = .         (5) 
To  implement  PSM,  equation  (5)  can  be  rewritten  (Muehler,  Beckmann  and 
Schauenberg 2007): 
i T i C j j j i i
PSM
ATT VA ln VA ln λ ∑ ∑ ∈ ∈ Λ − = ∆ } { , ,         (6) 
where i and j are treated and non-treated firms, respectively; T and C indicate 
treatment and control group, respectively;  j i, Λ  is the weight placed on control  
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firm j when matched to treated firm i
11;  i λ  can be used to reweight the treated 
sample if T > C, which is not the case in this study.  
Several PSM algorithms are available. They differ in how they trade off bias and 
efficiency of the estimator of the treatment effect (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). 
The most straightforward method is nearest-neighbor matching, which matches 
the performance of each treated firm with the non-treated that has the closest 
propensity score P[Z]. Replacement of the non-treated is allowed so as to reduce a 
potential bias through the avoidance of bad matched. To reduce the variance of 
the treatment estimator, more than one nearest-neighbor can be used. Specifi-
cally, n = 4 optimizes mean-squared error (Abadie and Imbens 2002, Abadie et 
al. 2004). However, some of the multiple nearest-neighbors could represent bad 
matches in terms of the propensity score and, thus, increase the estimation bias. 
Therefore, defining lower and upper limits of the distance between the propensity 
score of treatment and control observations (“caliper”) is an option. This could, 
on the other hand, exclude some of the controls and, thus, increase the estimation 
variance. Using all non-treated within this caliper could be a remedy and is called 
radius matching.  
Since it is difficult to decide upon the adequate caliper ex ante, another method – 
kernel matching – uses (almost) all non-treated firms as matches for every treated 
firm.  By  assigning  kernel  weights  to  matched  non-treated  firms,  this  method 
takes the different distances between treated and controls into account. Accord-
ing to Smith and Todd (2005), kernel matching regresses the counter-factual out-
come  on  a  constant,  weighted  by  kernel  weights.  The  local  linear  regression 
(LLR) matching method, finally, adds the propensity score as a regressor to this 
estimation equation. Therefore, LLR outperforms kernel matching if control firms 
are  distributed  asymmetrically  within  the  propensity  score  neighborhood  of  a 
treated firm. Kernel and LLR matching require setting the kernel function and 
the bandwidth parameter. Whereas the choice of the kernel function does not 
seem to be crucial (DiNardo and Tobias 2001), the bandwidth parameter imposes 
a trade-off (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). A high bandwidth aggregates much 
                                                 
 
11 This weight differs between different PSM algorithms, such as one-to-one, nearest-neighbor (NN 
> 1), radius, Kernel or local linear regression matching. For every treated firm i, however, the 
weights of matched non-treated j should add up to one:  1 , = Λ ∑j j i . On the contrary, at least 
when matching with replacement, ∑ Λ
i j i,  need not necessarily equal one, since, then, a non-
treated firm can be matched more than once to (different) treated firms.  
 
- 15 -
information. As a consequence, on the one hand the variance between the true 
and estimated density function decreases, but on the other the risk of a biased 
estimate also rises. As a compromise, this study applies the epanechnikov kernel 
function with a bandwidth of 0.06 for kernel matching and the tricube kernel 
function with a bandwidth of 0.8 for LLR matching. The empirical investigation 
in this study uses all of these matching algorithms to provide a sense of robust-
ness of the results. 
4.2.2 Empirical Results 
Table 3 shows OLS estimates of the performance effects of delayering. The first 
three columns refer to estimations that use log value added as dependent vari-
able; the last three columns refer to estimations that use the log of value added 
over total wages as dependent variable. Whereas the former is supposed to serve 
as a productivity measure, the latter should indicate profitability (efficiency) ef-
fects. As can be seen, firms having delayered in the past five years are about 20 
% more productive than firms having not. This estimate is highly significant even 
after controlling for basic input factors (capital and labor), regions and sectors as 
well as for other corporate restructuring concepts (downsizing and decentraliza-
tion) and other firm and market characteristics. As the number of control vari-
ables increases, the point estimate of the productivity effect of delayering slightly 
decreases from 21.6 % to 19.5 %. In addition, firms having delayered are over 10 
% more profitable (efficient) than others. This estimate, too, stays significant and 
decreases only slightly from 13.4 % to 11.9 % as more and more control variables 
are added to the regression equation.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
To account for a potential selectivity bias in the evaluation of the treatment ef-
fects, a PSM procedure is implemented, which requires the estimation of the pro-
pensity  score  of  delayering  in  a  first  step.  This  so-called  participation  model 
should include pre-treatment factors that simultaneously could influence a firm’s 
delayering decision and firm performance (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008; Bryson, 
Dorsett and Purdon 2002; Muehler, Beckmann and Schauenberg 2007). Since the 
key explanatory variable indicates whether a firm has removed management lev-
els since 2000, the KOF Innovation Survey 2005 is merged with the KOF Organi-
zation Survey 2000, which is similar to the Innovation Survey in what relates to 
sampling methodology and sample size, using a unique identifier. To avoid overi- 
 
- 16 -
dentification  of  the  participation  model  (Caliendo  and  Kopeinig  2008;  Bryson, 
Dorsett and Purdon 2002; Augurzky and Schmidt 2001) and because underiden-
tification should not lead to a large bias in this study, given the KOF data struc-
ture (Khandker, Koolwal and Samad 2010; Heckmann, Ichimura and Todd 1997, 
1998), the participation model is defined in a way similar to that in Muehler, 
Beckmann and Schauenberg (2007). Each variable that potentially and simulta-
neously  could  influence a  firm’s  delayering  decision  and  firm  performance  was 
added separately to a baseline specification, which consisted of regional and sec-
tor dummies (from the Organization Survey 2000) and a constant. The variables 
that were significant in the probit estimation were then entered simultaneously in 
the participation model. Those were decentr and down (from the Innovation Sur-
vey 2005), i.e. dummy variables indicating whether a firm had delegated decision-
making authority to workers since 2000 and whether a firm had downsized by 
selling divisions or outsourcing functions since 2000, respectively.  
The matching quality is assessed in Figure 2 and Tables A2 and A3 in the ap-
pendix. Table A2 displays the first-step probit estimations for the productivity 
and profitability sample, respectively. For both samples, goodness of fit of the 
regression as a whole is satisfactory. In particular, the two variables identified 
separately – i.e., decentralization and downsizing – are highly significant in pre-
dicting whether or not a firm has delayered. Table A3 lists standardized biases 
before and after matching as well as the percentage bias reduction for each vari-
able in the participation model, which is a common procedure in the evaluation 
literature (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008).
12 As can be seen, standardized biases 
after matching are below 5 % for most of the variables used; especially for decentr 
and down they are below 3 %. Moreover, huge reductions of over 80 % in the 
standardized biases are achieved through matching for most of the variables used; 
especially for decentr and down the reduction is over 90 %. Finally,  Figure 2 
graphs the distribution of the propensity scores for treated and controls. As can 
be seen, there is considerable overlap in the range of propensity scores for treated 
and  control  firms.  In  general,  common  support  is  implemented  by  dropping 
treated firms whose propensity score is higher than the maximum or less than the 
minimum  propensity  score  of  the  controls.  However,  this  has  to  be  done  ex-
tremely rarely in this study. To conclude, the matching quality seems to meet 
                                                 
 
12 It refers to the nearest-neighbor matching (n = 4) variant with log value added as outcome con-
sidered. Standardized biases and percentage bias reduction in the cases of other matching algo-
rithms and the alternative dependent variable are similar and can be obtained from the author 
upon request.  
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common quality standards. Thus, the data examined in this study seem to satisfy 
the identifying assumptions of the matching procedure discussed above.  
Table 4 displays PSM estimates of the performance effects of delayering. Results 
are split between dependent variables (log value added vs. the log of value added 
over total wages) and, further, between ATEs and ATTs. For the purpose of ro-
bustness, several matching algorithms discussed further above are used and re-
ported.  As  can  be  seen,  there  are  significant  and  large  ATEs  on  productivity 
ranging from 45.4 % to 78.5 %. However, controlling for selectivity by calculating 
the  ATTs  removes  this  positive  productivity  effect.  As  for  profitability  (effi-
ciency), there are no significant ATEs. But by controlling for selectivity, highly 
significant ATTs in the range from 14.1 % to 18.8 % show up. This result is ro-
bust across almost all matching algorithms used; only one method fails to produce 
a significant estimate by only 1.2 percentage points.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of the present study was to empirically examine the performance effects 
of delayering. For this purpose, the KOF Innovation Survey 2005, a nationally 
representative data set of firms in Switzerland was used. Applying ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions and propensity score matching (PSM), this study pro-
vides first large-scale quantitative-econometric evidence on the direct net effects 
of delayering programs on firm performance. The findings show that delayering 
increases  subsequent  firm  performance  in  terms  of  profitability  (efficiency)  by 
roughly 15 % accounting for selectivity based on observable factors. The esti-
mated positive performance effects persist among different sets of control vari-
ables (in OLS) capturing firm characteristics and market conditions as well as 
among different matching algorithms (in PSM) such as nearest-neighbor, radius, 
kernel or local linear regression matching.  
With respect to the theoretical discussion, it can be concluded that, on average, 
the positive performance effects of delayering – such as, e.g., a better information 
flow, faster and more complex decisions, as well as increased intrinsic motivation 
of  employees  –  seem  to  outweigh  the  negative  effects  –  such  as,  e.g.,  loss  of 
knowledge and human capital, the occurrence of the survivor syndrome, dimin- 
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ished extrinsic motivation due to a smaller option value of any promotion, and 
more conflicts within the same management level.  
The main contribution of the present study to the literature is in the field of or-
ganizational theory. The results obtained suggest that the broad delayering trend 
in the 1990s was not merely a pure managerial trend. Instead, flatter hierarchical 
structures indeed seem to enable firms to better realize their competitive advan-
tage  in  today’s  fast  moving  and  knowledge-intensive  market  environment.  So, 
these  results  are  in  line  with  the  economically  oriented  strategic  management 
literature (Chandler 1962; Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman 2009) and the tradi-
tional industrial organization literature (Bresnahan 1989).  
Apart from that, regarding the tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981), the 
fact that the estimated productivity effects are larger than the estimated profit-
ability (efficiency) effects suggests that firms removing hierarchical levels have to 
increase wages in order to uphold incentives for managers, given the decreased 
option value of any promotion in a flattened hierarchy. This result is in line with 
the findings of Bauer and Bender (2001), who found that delayering increases 
mean wages and the wage distributions within firms, especially at the top end.  
In interpreting the results obtained in this study, admittedly, one has to bear in 
mind  a  potential  limitation.  Although  considerable  efforts  have  been  made  to 
eliminate biases arising from selection on observables, unobserved factors could 
still influence a firm’s delayering decision and performance simultaneously. Time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity could be controlled for using a difference-in-
differences  or  a  combined  matching  difference-in-differences  approach,  which 
would require longitudinal data. However, the data base of this empirical investi-
gation, namely the KOF Innovation Survey 2005 and the KOF Organization Sur-
vey 2000, is not supposed to represent a panel data set in a strict sense but is 
more appropriately seen as a set of repeated cross sections. Since the overlap of 
these surveys is about 40 %, a sample size that provides a sufficient number of 
degrees of freedom for the estimation may not be guaranteed. Additionally, an-
other selection bias could emerge if firms participating in the Organization Survey 
differed  from  firms  participating  in  the  Innovation  Survey  with  regard  to  ob-
served or unobserved factors, e.g. interest in the emphasized content of the re-
spective survey. To summarize, the potential gains of additional investigations 
have to be traded off against potential pitfalls. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Delayering Trend 






438 Italian manufacturing 
plants with more than ten 
employees (stratified with 
respect to industry (within 
manufacturing), geographi-
cal area and size) 
1989-
1997 
74% (65%, 36%) of plants with 
six (five, four) management levels 
have removed one or more level; 
span of control of large plants (> 
500 employees) has increased from 
8.74 to 12.51. 
Whitting-




of about 450 Western 
European large- and me-
dian-sized firm (i.e., with 
500 or more employees) 
1992-
1996 
30% of these firms delayered at 
least one level
14; 
average number of managerial 
levels between the CEO and the 
division heads – i.e., the lowest 
managers with profit center re-





300 large US firms (bal-
anced sample: N = 51) 
1986- 
1998 
average number of positions be-
tween the CEO and the division 
heads – i.e., the lowest managers 
with profit center responsibility – 
has decreased by 25%; 
average (median) number of man-
agers reporting directly to the 
CEO has gone up from 4.4 (4) to 
8.2 (7). 




68% of these organizations had 
done delayering or another form 
of restructuring. 
---“---  Late 
1990s 






2’964 organizations with 50 
or more employees in South 




45.5% of organizations in South 
Africa had delayered, 44% in 








managerial span of control rose 
from 11.38 to 14.41. 
Source: Own compilation. 
                                                 
 
13 According to the authors, questionnaires were sent out to the largest 1'500 UK firms and to 2'000 
firms in other countries. No comprehensive list is provided but Germany, France, Spain, Italy, 
Netherlands and one or more Scandinavian countries seem to be covered. The non-UK sample was 
proportional to the GDP of the respective countries. The overall response rate was 13.1%.  
14 Ruigrok et al. (1999) use the same data set and provide more detailed information. The extent of 
delayering varies among countries. For instance, in the UK, 28% of the firms have delayered, 32% 
in German-speaking countries, 29% in Southern Europe and 33% in Northern Europe.  
15 The data used by Littler and Innes (2004) exclude the public sector, overrepresent the manufac-
turing industry, and do not cover small and medium-sized corporations. Despite this, the descriptive 
analysis of the authors provides valuable insights into the change of organizational structure on a 
large-scale basis for Australia.   
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Table 2: Transition Probability Matrix 
number of  number of levels in 2005 
levels in 2000  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  Total 
0  33.33  33.33  0.00  33.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00 
1  0.69  27.78  49.31  15.28  3.47  2.78  0.69  0.00  100.00 
2  0.82  15.64  44.03  27.98  9.47  1.65  0.41  0.00  100.00 
3  0.00  9.89  26.92  40.11  16.48  5.49  1.10  0.00  100.00 
4  0.00  4.48  16.42  40.30  28.36  7.46  1.49  1.49  100.00 
5  0.00  23.53  11.76  29.41  23.53  5.88  0.00  5.88  100.00 
6  0.00  0.00  25.00  25.00  25.00  0.00  25.00  0.00  100.00 
7  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00  0.00  0.00  100.00 
8  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00 
Total  0.60  15.71  36.40  29.91  12.39  3.78  0.91  0.30  100.00 
Note: Calculation restricted to 662 firms covered in both surveys. 
Source: Organization Survey 2000, Innovation Survey 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates of Performance Effects of Delayering 
Dependent 
variable 
Log Value Added  Log (Value Added / Total Wages) 
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Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 












N  1’066  1’066  1’066  1’025  1’025  1’025 
R
2  0.8377  0.8379  0.8504  0.2115  0.2149  0.2330 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust 
according to White (1980). */**/*** indicate significance on the 10/5/1% level. 
Source: Innovation Survey 2005, own calculations. 
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Table 4: PSM Estimates of Performance Effects of Delayering 
Dependent  
variable 
Log Value Added  Log (Value Added / Total Wages) 
  ATE  ATT  ATE  ATT 
Nearest-neighbor 



























































Treated   122  118 
N  1’242  1’191 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. */**/*** indicate significance on the 
10/5/1% level. LLR stands for local linear regression. 
Source: Organization Survey 2000, Innovation Survey 2005, own calculations. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Depth and Breath of an Organization 
 
Source: Carzo and Yanouzas (1969). 
 
 
Figure 2: Propensity Score Matching: Common Support 
0 .1 .2 .3 .4
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support
Treated
 
Source: Organization Survey 2000, Innovation Survey 2005, own calculations. 
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Table A 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Observations  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
ln(VA/W)  1’025  -4.053  0.423  -4.605  -0.010 
lnVA  1’066  16.54  1.33  13.605  23.591 
lnK  1’066  13.46  1.89  2.303  24.750 
lnL  1’066  4.63  1.11  0  10.575 
delayer  1’066  0.10  0.30  0  1 
down  1’066  0.42  0.49  0  1 
decentr  1’066  0.36  0.48  0  1 
level  1’066  2.52  1.21  0  15 
foreign  1’066  0.17  0.37  0  1 
skilled  1’066  20.17  18.27  0  100 
train  1’066  28.68  27.94  0  100 
ICT01  1’066  0.48  0.50  0  1 
export  1’066  25.97  35.29  0  100 
compet01  1’066  0.39  0.49  0  1 
intens01  1’066  0.43  0.49  0  1 
founded  1’066  1942.29  46.34  1350  2005 
Note: Calculation restricted to OLS regression sample (dependent variable: lnVA). Re-
gional and sector controls have been omitted due to space reasons. 
Source: Innovation Survey 2005, own calculations. 
 
Table A 2: Probit Estimates of Propensity Scores of Delayering 
 
 
Dependent variable: Delayering (probit estimation) 
Outcome vari-
able for PSM 
in 2
nd step: 
Log Value Added  Log (Value Added / Total 
Wages) 
decentr  0.597***  (0.000)  0.599***  (0.000) 
down  0.409***  (0.000)  0.441***  (0.000) 
reg002  0.011  (0.954)  -0.014  (0.941) 
reg003  0.010  (0.961)  -0.011  (0.955) 
reg004  0.118  (0.523)  0.145  (0.436) 
reg005  -0.135  (0.490)  -0.180  (0.366) 
reg006  -0.040  (0.862)  -0.028  (0.901) 
reg007  -0.184  (0.536)  -0.200  (0.504) 
sec002  -0.150  (0.399)  -0.131  (0.467) 
sec003  -0.139  (0.384)  -0.215  (0.201) 
sec004  -0.480  (0.152)  -0.408  (0.235) 
sec005  0.100  (0.660)  0.021  (0.930) 
sec006  0.251  (0.156)  0.243  (0.175) 
sec007  0.077  (0.774)  -0.085  (0.770) 
Constant  -1.740***  (0.000)  -1.731***  (0.000) 
N  1’242  1’191 
Pseudo R2  0.0843  0.0892 
chi2(14)  67.22  68.67 
Prob > chi2  0.000  0.000 
Log likelihood  -365.287  -350.417 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are p-values. */**/*** indicate significance on the 
10/5/1% level. 
Source: Organization Survey 2000 (reg002-reg007, sec002-sec007), Innovation Survey 
2005 (delayer, decentr, down), own calculations. 
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Table A 3: Standardized Bias  
    Mean     
  Sample  Treated  Control  %bias  %reduct 
|bias| 
Unmatched  0.615  0.316  62.6    decentr 
Matched  0.615  0.607  1.7  97.3 
Unmatched  0.631  0.404  46.7    down 
Matched  0.631  0.643  -2.5  94.6 
Unmatched  0.205  0.215  -2.5    reg002 
Matched  0.205  0.162  10.5  -319.4 
Unmatched  0.148  0.150  -0.7    reg003 
Matched  0.148  0.205  -16.1  -2233.3 
Unmatched  0.246  0.192  13.0    reg004 
Matched  0.246  0.240  1.5  88.6 
Unmatched  0.156  0.183  -7.3    reg005 
Matched  0.156  0.164  -2.2  70.0 
Unmatched  0.090  0.090  0.0    reg006 
Matched  0.090  0.080  3.6  -69900.0 
Unmatched  0.033  0.046  -7.0    reg007 
Matched  0.033  0.035  -1.0  85.0 
Unmatched  0.082  0.143  -19.3    sec002 
Matched  0.082  0.080  0.7  96.6 
Unmatched  0.131  0.153  -6.2    sec003 
Matched  0.131  0.127  1.2  81.0 
Unmatched  0.016  0.046  -17.3    sec004 
Matched  0.016  0.020  -2.4  86.4 
Unmatched  0.066  0.042  10.5    sec005 
Matched  0.066  0.045  9.1  13.2 
Unmatched  0.123  0.083  13.1    sec006 
Matched  0.123  0.150  -8.8  33.3 
Unmatched  0.041  0.039  0.9    sec007 
Matched  0.041  0.025  8.3  -865.5 
Note: This table refers to the propensity score estimation of delayering in which match-
ing in the second step is performed applying nearest-neighbor matching (n = 4) and 
using log value added as outcome, i.e. to the middle column of Table A2. 
Source: Organization Survey 2000 (reg002-reg007, sec002-sec007), Innovation Survey 
2005 (delayer, decentr, down), own calculations. 
 
 